THE STATUTORY EXPERT RELIANCE DEFENSE
AND FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 702:
LESSONS IN GATEKEEPING
Valorie K. Vojdik*
Professor Moll invites corporate scholars and lawyers to explore
the benefits and risks of corporate statutes that provide board directors a
defense for good faith reliance on expert reports. His presentation,
“Breach of Fiduciary Duty by Corporate Directors and the Defense of
Reliance on Experts,” poses critical questions about the scope and
impact of this defense.1 Moll invites us to think more closely about this
statutory defense. Should corporate directors be able to rely on
information and reports by experts in discharging their fiduciary duties?
What are the risks and benefits of the expert reliance defense? As a
scholar of federal courts and procedure, and a former litigator, I suggest
that corporate scholars might consider Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which reflects one approach to addressing some of these
tensions and concerns.2
Many corporate statutes provide that directors, in discharging
their fiduciary duties, may rely in good faith upon information, opinions,
reports or statements from experts. These statutes provide a defense for
directors “when their allegedly uninformed or wrongful decisions were
based on credible information provided by others.”3 Section 141(e) of
the Delaware General Corporation Law provides that corporate directors
are fully protected when they rely in good faith upon information,
opinions, reports or statements presented to the corporation by experts.
It provides:
A member of the board of directors . . . shall, in the
performance of such members’ duties, be fully protected
in relying in good faith upon . . . such information,
opinions, reports or statements presented to the
corporation by any of the corporation’s officers or
employees, or committees of the board of directors, or by
any other person as to matters the member reasonably believes are
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within such other person’s professional or expert competence and
who has been selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the
corporation.4
Moll argues that these statutes arguably encourage directors to
consult with experts, which is valuable to the corporation.5 As a practical
matter, directors cannot be expected to have deep expertise in every
aspect of a corporation’s business. Requiring a director to be a “jack of
all trades,” Moll observes, is unrealistic. 6 Directors routinely rely on
information and reports from others with more specific knowledge and
expertise. These statutes, Moll suggests, encourage directors to seek
expert advice, which arguably improves the quality of director decisionmaking.7 Yet Moll raises a critical question about this supposed salutary
effect. Do the statutes help corporations or do they result in “expert
shopping” by directors who might be eager to set up the statutory
defense?8
Moll’s inquiry regarding the expert reliance defense raises
questions familiar to judges, trial lawyers, and scholars who have
grappled with the admissibility of expert testimony under the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Both the statutory defense for directors and Rule
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence recognize that expert reports can
be extremely probative and helpful to the ultimate factfinder. In the case
of the corporation, the factfinder is the director tasked with making a
business decision on behalf of the corporation. In a trial, the factfinder
is the judge or jury assigned the role of determining disputed facts at
trial. In both cases, the relevant rules recognize the need for the
factfinder to make an informed decision and specifically permit the
factfinder to consider and rely on expert opinions. A comparison of the
statutory defense and Rule 702 reveals that both address the need for the
expert report to be helpful to the factfinder and to be reliable. The
Rules of Evidence, however, require judges—neutral and independent—
to make specific findings germane to these threshold issues within the
context of an adversarial trial.
Both statutes recognize and require that an expert report may be
considered by the factfinder if it is helpful or relevant. The Delaware
corporate statute specifically permits directors to rely on information by
experts in making decisions as a board member, recognizing the need
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for, and usefulness, of such reports. The director makes that decision
and, to obtain the protection of the defense, must show that s/he has
done so “in good faith.”9 Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
similarly requires an expert opinion to be helpful to the factfinder. It
specifically requires the judge to find that the proposed expert testimony
“will help the trier of fact understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue.” 10 The judge thus acts as a neutral gatekeeper, making an
independent decision as to the helpfulness of the report to the
factfinder. To make this determination, the judge hears argument by
opposing counsel and must take into account, as with all evidence,
whether its probative value is outweighed by any prejudice that might
arise. This balancing test helps to insure that the evidence will be helpful
and not overly harmful to the jury’s deliberations.
Both statutes also require consideration of qualifications of the
expert. The need for reliability is critical in both the corporate
boardroom and the federal courtroom. As Professor Moll observes, the
statutory expert reliance defense might perversely incentivize directors to
seek opinions from experts known by the director to support his or her
views.11 The same risk arises in litigation under the Rules of Evidence.
Lawyers have an incentive to retain—and pay—expert witnesses who
make a living testifying for one side or another, the so-called “hired gun.”
In both contexts, the relevant rule/law seeks to address and minimize
that risk. Delaware § 141(e), for example, requires that a director who
seeks to rely on the defense must show that s/he “reasonably believes”
that the expert has the “professional or expert competence” to provide
information or an opinion on the matter in question.12 Further, § 141(e)
requires that the expert “has been selected with reasonable care by or on
behalf of the corporation.” 13
The Federal Rules of Evidence take a more muscular approach.
Under Rule 702, the federal judge plays a key gatekeeper function,
deciding as a threshold matter whether a witness is qualified to testify as
an expert. Thus, the decision as to whether a witness has the requisite
“knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” to offer an expert
opinion rests with the judge.14 To make this determination, the judge
hears evidence and argument from counsel for the opposing parties. In
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contrast, § 141(e) relies upon the director’s “reasonable belief ” in the
expertise of the expert, coupled with the requirement that the
corporation use “reasonable care” in selecting the expert.15 While the
Delaware statutory defense takes into account the fiduciary duties of
care and loyalty owed by the director and the corporation, Rule 702
places the gatekeeping function in the hands of a neutral, independent
federal judge, who is able to fully consider and evaluate competing
arguments as to the qualifications of the expert. The process is not
perfect. Some scholars have criticized Rule 702 for not providing more
specific guidance to judges, leading judges to rely on statements by
experts regarding their credentials instead of requiring proof of
expertise—for example, objective evidence of the an expert’s actual
proficiency.16 Rule 702, however, is designed to give judges flexibility in
admitting expert testimony. The adversarial nature of a trial, moreover,
helps insure that the judge considers the relevant arguments for and
against the expert’s qualifications.
Assuming the judge determines the witness is qualified to testify,
Rule 702 further requires the judge to determine whether the expert
testimony is reliable. It provides:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the
form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.17
The Advisory Notes explain that Rule 702 was amended in 2000
to reflect the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v.
Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and subsequent cases, requiring trial
judges to act as “gatekeepers” to exclude unreliable scientific and expert
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testimony.18 In Daubert, the Supreme Court set forth a non-exhaustive
list of factors for the courts to consider in making this determination:
(1) whether the expert’s technique or theory can be or has been tested—
that is, whether the expert’s theory can be challenged in some objective
sense, or whether it is instead simply a subjective, conclusory approach
that cannot reasonably be assessed for reliability; (2) whether the
technique or theory has been subject to peer review and publication; (3)
the known or potential rate of error of the technique or theory when
applied; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards and controls;
and (5) whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in
the scientific community.19
In contrast to Delaware’s director expert reliance statute, Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 thus provides more specific guidance to courts for
determining whether an expert’s testimony is sufficiently reliable to
justify consideration by the factfinder. Designed to exclude unreliable
expert evidence, Rule 702 and judicial review of expert testimony under
the Daubert/Kumho standard is not perfect. Numerous scholars have
argued that judges fail to apply Rule 702 adequately or fairly.20 For
example, scholars have argued that judges have failed to carry out their
gatekeeping duties toward forensic science, resulting in the admission of
unreliable expert testimony in criminal cases.21 Other scholars argue that
courts exhibit bias in determining the admissibility of evidence, routinely
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admitting the government’s expert witnesses in criminal cases while
rigorously scrutinizing plaintiffs’ experts in civil cases.22 Nevertheless,
the evidentiary rules at a minimum provide a framework for the explicit
consideration of the relevance and reliability of expert testimony,
recognizing the importance of these threshold issues.
The statutory expert reliance defense allows corporate directors
to rely on expert reports and avoid liability for erroneous or harmful
decisions. Delaware’s Section 141(e) illustrates the need to strike the
proper balance between the benefits of reliance on expert testimony
with the possible costs or harm. Professor Moll raises important
questions about how to strike that balance. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence seeks a similar balance, requiring judges to determine the
reliability of proffered expert evidence using flexible, non-exhaustive
factors to assess the evidence. Whether such an approach would allay
some of the concerns raised by Professor Moll is unclear. At a
minimum, a brief comparison of both approaches suggests that
Professor Moll’s concerns are important issues to address.
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